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Husak: Crimes Outside the Core

CRIMES OUTSIDE THE CORE

Douglas Husak*
I am delighted to contribute to an issue commemorating the twenty-fifth
anniversary of Rethinking Criminal Law (Rethinking).' I believe that Rethinking
is the most important book in the English language about the philosophy of
criminal law written in the past century. Some readers will suspect this statement
to be hyperbole-the sort of inflated praise that is bestowed only on occasions in
which the author himself is honored. If so, they are invited to propose their own
candidate for this distinction, and to compare its impact with that of Rethinking. I
am confident that no alternative will prove to be as influential 2 I re-read
significant portions of Rethinking in the course of preparing this essay, and I
continue to be struck by the sheer number of brilliant and original insights.
Fletcher's treatment of omissions, for example-to name just one of many topics
on which I will have almost nothing to say here-is a major advance in the field of
criminal law theory.
I say that Rethinking is central to the philosophy of criminal law because its
central theme is that the criminal law contains an internal normative structure that
is not simply imposed by the legislature. According to Fletcher, the task of3
criminal theory is "to explicate and refine the principles implicit in this structure.,
If theoreticians are to perform this task proficiently, they have just as much need
to draw from moral and political philosophy as from positive law. It is hard to say
whether Rethinking is more valuable for law professors who specialize in criminal
law or for philosophers who try to theorize about it.
On a personal note, no volume comes close to Rethinking in having altered
the trajectory of my own research. After my introduction to the many issues I first
confronted in Rethinking, I came to realize the possibility of an entire career
exploring questions at the intersection of criminal law and moral philosophy. 4 It is
only a slight exaggeration to say that my actual scholarly career has conformed to
this description. The following essay is not designed to criticize as much as to

*

Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University.

1. George P. Fletcher, Rethinking CriminalLaw (Little, Brown & Co. 1978).
2. In my view, there are three serious competitors: H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility:
Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford U. Press 1968); R.A. Duff, Criminal Attempts (Clarendon
Press 1996); and Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law (Clarendon
Press 1997). All three books are required reading for serious theorists of the criminal law.
3. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 406.
4. The book begins: "Criminal law is a species of political and moral philosophy." Id. at xix.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:755

extend some of the basic ideas in Rethinking. In the past twenty-five years, the
criminal law that Fletcher rethought has changed dramatically-almost always for
the worse-and the time has come to review the implications of Fletcher's general
approach for some of the developments that most commentators (including
myself) regard as unfortunate. My efforts will draw heavily from the work of
contemporary scholars who also owe a tremendous intellectual debt to George
Fletcher.
I.

PATrERNS OF LIABILITY

George Fletcher, I believe, was the first to suggest that the criminal law
contains a core. Unfortunately, he does not explicate this claim in detail, but
allows it to remain intuitive. As metaphor, this supposition would lead us to
believe that the criminal law also contains a periphery that surrounds its center.
But how is this contrast between core and periphery to be drawn? Offenses in the
core cannot simply be those that are amenable to whatever analyses Fletcher
defends throughout Rethinking. This device to identify the core of the criminal
law would be circular, ensuring the cogency of the subsequent analyses by
definitional fiat. Potential counterexamples cannot be excluded from the scope of
these analyses so easily. What independent criteria should be applied to decide
which criminal offenses belong in the core and which should be relegated to the
periphery?
The answer is not altogether clear, since core offenses might be identified in
any number of ways. At least three devices to distinguish core from peripheral
offenses are plausible. The first criterion is historical. Core offenses might be
those that all Anglo-American jurisdictions have contained for centuries, and have
come to be included in the prestigious Model Penal Code.5 Of course, the content
of many such offenses has evolved over time. Few contemporary rape statutes, for
example, still provide for marital immunity. 6 Still, we easily recognize modern
rape statutes as the product of evolution from offenses that have long existed at
common law. Alternatively, core offenses might be identified as those that
consume the bulk of the workload in our systems of criminal justice. Our theory
of criminal law should not be detached from the actual business of police,
prosecutors, and judges. By this criterion, drug offenses-and the offense of drug
possession in particular-should be assigned to the core of criminal law. Under
current federal law, more persons are arrested and punished for drug offenses
than for any other category of crime.' Finally, the criterion might be normative.
Crimes in the core might be those that exhibit whatever features commentators
take to be important. Criminal theorists, for example, attach enormous normative
5. Despite accolades from most others, it is noteworthy that no influential criminal theorist seems
to be less enamored with the Model Penal Code than Fletcher. See George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the
Model Penal Code, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3 (1998).
6. See Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code's Sexual Offense Provisions Should Be
Pulled and Replaced, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 207, 213 (2003).
7. Bureau of J. Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-2001, at tbl. 5.18, 415 (Ann L.
Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., U.S. Dept. of J. 2002).
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significance to the requirement of mens rea. Statutes that dispense with mens rea
by imposing strict liability might be consigned to the periphery, even if they came
to outnumber those that require culpability for each material element.
Fletcher's own method for identifying the core of the criminal law
corresponds to none of these three possibilities. How, then, does he draw the
distinction between offenses in the core and those outside it? This question is best
answered by examining the use to which he puts the idea that the criminal law
contains a core. In other words, we must try to understand the point of consigning
some crimes to the core and others to the periphery. In fact, Fletcher puts this
contrast to several distinct purposes. One such purpose, however, is especially
important, and I propose to focus on it here. Rethinking provides a systematic
defense of what Fletcher calls a polycentric (or pluralistic) theory of the nature of
the criminal law. 8 He argues, that is, that no single principle can hope to provide
an adequate account of the content of the criminal law.9 Scholars are advised to
"resist the temptation to reduce the criminal law to a single formula for
determining when conduct ought to be treated as criminal."10 Instead, crimes in
the core of the criminal law tend to conform to one of three distinct patterns of
liability-amongthe most central insights in Rethinking. Although the suggestion
that criminal law exhibits these patterns is fraught with ambiguity and confusion, I
will argue that Fletcher's basic insight may be even more powerful than he
appears to have realized.
A very brief summary of Fletcher's views about these three patterns of
liability is necessary. The first such pattern is named manifest criminality.
External acts occupy the focus in crimes of this class, and mental states are
relegated to a secondary status. Neutral third-parties would be able to recognize
the activity as dangerous and harmful without knowing the actor's intention. The
act must manifest the actor's criminal purpose and typically constitutes an
unnerving threat to the order of community life. The second such pattern is
labeled subjective criminality. Intentions to violate a protected interest are the
essence of these crimes. Acts serve merely to demonstrate the firmness of the
actor's resolve and to provide evidence of his mental state. The third and final
pattern is described as harmful consequences. Here, neither acts nor intentions
have the same significance as in previous patterns. Instead, liability is based on
the objective attribution to a responsible person of a harmful event that is
conceptually independent of human action or state of mind.
According to Fletcher, no theory of criminal law is adequate if it disregards
any of these three patterns. I do not know whether the majority of commentators
concur, so that the indispensability of these three patterns should now be
8. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at xxii.
9. Curiously, Fletcher subsequently defends the view that dominion is common to virtually all
crimes, thereby supporting his surprising conclusion that blackmail is a paradigmatic offense. This
claim is difficult to reconcile with his commitment to the polycentrism that pervades Rethinking.
Moreover, it has the odd consequence of categorizing homicide offenses as nonparadigmatic. See
George P. Fletcher, Blackmail: The ParadigmaticCrime, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1617 (1993).
10. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at xxii.
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described as orthodoxy among criminal theorists."
Since Rethinking, many
scholars have succumbed to the very temptation against which Fletcher cautioned.
In the philosophy of criminal law, as elsewhere in jurisprudence, "the itch for
uniformity... is strong., 12 Typically, theorists who depart from Fletcher's
polycentric model have sought to eliminate one pattern or another, usually by
expanding the scope of those that remain. The pattern of harmful consequences
has given rise to the greatest controversy. By my informal count, nearly half of all
contemporary criminal theorists hold that actual results in the world ought to be
irrelevant to whether or to what extent criminal liability should be imposed. Many
commentators, including Andrew Ashworth, propose to shrink or eliminate the
pattern of harmful consequences, generally by enlarging the pattern of subjective
criminality. 3 Less frequently, commentators advocate expanding rather than
contracting the pattern of harmful consequences-usually at the expense of
subjective criminality.
Heidi Hurd, for example, defends "completed act
deontology," arguing that only completed actions, and not intentions or tryings,
can be wrongs.1 4 Other theorists propose to enlarge the pattern of manifest
criminality-again, at the expense of subjective criminality. 5
I will not rehearse the pros and cons of these controversial views; the details
of the positions and the arguments in their favor contain subtle variations and
refinements that resist simple summaries. Suffice it to say that none of these
positions has ever been implemented in any existing jurisdiction and generally
would necessitate a radical rewriting of criminal codes. Of course, this statement
hardly entails that any of these reforms must be deficient. No coherent normative
theory-regardless of how simple or polycentric it may be-can hope to make
sense of more than a fraction of the criminal law that actually exists. Arguably,
the fact that a given theory identifies a huge chunk of the criminal law as deficient
counts as an advantage rather than a disadvantage. 16
Much subsequent commentary not only tries to eliminate or narrow a given
pattern, but also endeavors to blur the contrasts between those patterns that
remain. Consider, for example, the pattern of harmful consequences. As we have

11. The centrality of these three patterns figures prominently in other scholarly work on the
criminal law. Only the names are changed. For example, the patterns replicate the tripartite account
of the moral content of offenses defended by Stuart Green. See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46
Emory L.J. 1533 (1997).
12. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 32 (Clarendon Press 1961).
13. See Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm under the Code, and
in the Common Law, 19 Rutgers L.J. 725, 764 (1988); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment:A
Critiqueof Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the CriminalLaw, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1497 (1974).
14. Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World Is Wrong?, 5 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 157 (1994).
15. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1138 (1997).
16. My own efforts to construct a normative theory to limit the scope of the criminal law probably
imply that a great many existing offenses are unjustified. See e.g. Douglas N. Husak, Limitations on
Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal Law, in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines of the
General Part 13 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., Oxford U. Press 2002); Douglas Husak, Guns
and Drugs: Case Studies on the Principled Limits of the Criminal Sanction, 23 L. & Phil.
(forthcoming Sept. 2004).
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seen, crimes that fit this pattern seemingly presuppose the ability to identify a
harmful result independently of human action or intention. The paradigm, of
course, is the harm of death caused by homicide. As Duff has argued, however,
we identify this harm quite differently depending on the type of wrongful action
that causes it.17 The distinctive harm suffered by the victim of an intentional
homicide is not just that he died-which might as well have been caused by a
flood or hurricane-but that he was murdered. The fact that a given offense is a
"result-crime" should not blind us to the significance of the kind of wrongful
action that causes the result-even when characterizing the nature of the result
itself. The contrast between these wrongful actions is central to Duff's distinction
between attacks and endangerments, which he argues have different conceptual
structures.1 8 If Duff is correct-and I believe that he is-the boundaries between
Fletcher's patterns tend to blur.
Despite these complexities, I am persuaded that Fletcher was absolutely
right to insist that each of his three patterns of liability is essential both
descriptively and normatively-to explain the criminal law as it is, in addition to
how it ought to be. In fact, his polycentric model may be even more powerful than
Fletcher himself seemed to appreciate. The significance of these patterns becomes
evident when we consider their possible implications for crimes that conform to
none of them-for crimes outside the core. Before I offer my own thoughts on
these implications, we need to turn to Fletcher's own remarks about some of these
offenses. Fletcher explicitly acknowledges that several existing crimes do not
conform to any of the three patterns he describes. He cautions that "[n]ot even
the three patterns account for more than many of the major offenses."1 9 He lists
perjury and kidnapping as crimes "it would be a mistake to squeeze... into one of
the three patterns."2 ° In a later footnote, he mentions "[pirohibited sexual
behavior" 2 such as adultery, incest, and statutory rape as examples of crimes that
"fall in the gaps left by the three patterns of liability."22 In light of these apparent
counterexamples, he concludes "[t]he most we can claim for our theory of the
three patterns 3 of liability is that we may illuminate the core offenses of the
2
criminal law.
I confess that I am unsure what to make of these remarks. I fail to see why
at least one of these crimes-statutory rape-does not conform to the pattern of
harmful consequences. If the victim of statutory rape were not placed in a harmed
condition simply by the act of sexual penetration, there would be no good reason
to dispense with culpability or to deny the relevance of consent. I will return to

17. See R.A. Duff, Harmsand Wrongs, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 13 (2001).
18. R.A. Duff, Criminalising Endangerment, in Defining Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law's
Special Part (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., Oxford U. Press forthcoming 2005) (copy on file with
Tulsa Law Review).
19. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 389.
20. Id. at 233.
21. Id. at 389 n. 20.
22 Id.
23. Id. at 234.
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some of the other alleged exceptions later. At this time, I want to consider what
their existence reveals about the patterns of liability. If we are able to grasp why
the foregoing examples are thought to qualify as exceptions to the analysis
Fletcher has provided, we may better understand the nature and significance of
the analysis itself. We have seen that Fletcher alleges that his theory helps to
"illuminate the core offenses of the criminal law" and that the alleged
counterexamples fall outside this core, notwithstanding their status as "major
offenses." The challenge is to avoid the circularity to which I alluded earlier. If
there is no basis for consigning offenses to the periphery other than the
inconvenient fact that they are not amenable to Fletcher's analysis, his claim that
the patterns illuminate the core of the criminal law becomes an uninformative
tautology.
Alternatively, I think that some of the examples to which Fletcher refers
might be construed as hybrids-offenses that exhibit essential features of more
than one pattern simultaneously. Consider perjury, for example. Like many
crimes of deception, it is hard to say whether its most important feature is the act
of deception or the intention to deceive.2 ' But if particular offenses are to be
banished from the core simply because they are hybrids, containing essential
features of distinct patterns, a great many additional crimes must be relegated to
the periphery as well. In fact, many and perhaps most crimes turn out to be
hybrids, depending on how we solve the delicate problem of assigning a particular
crime to a given pattern. Since the vast majority of core offenses require a union
of prohibited act and mental state, the placement of a given offense into a pattern
depends on which of their characteristics is taken to be the most basic or
fundamental. Thus I remain puzzled about why some of the examples Fletcher
identifies allegedly qualify as exceptions to his analysis. Because of this
uncertainty, I admit to some confusion about the significance and nature of the
analysis itself.
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, I return to my attempt to understand
the claim that the core of criminal law can be analyzed in terms of three patterns
of liability.26 Fletcher is explicit that "[t]he value of these abstract patterns is their
explanatory power,
and that this explanatory power is both descriptive and
28
normative. For present purposes, the latter is more important than the former.
Fletcher elaborates as follows: "The patterns.., have normative implications, for
they each state a plausible and coherent theory for prohibiting and punishing

24. See infra pt. II.
25. Or even the consequences of a deception for legal proceedings. Under the Model Penal Code,
the deception must be material, even if it does not actually affect the outcome. See Model Penal Code
§ 241.1 (ALI 1962).
26. Fletcher makes a few remarks about what these patterns are not, although some of these
disclaimers are unhelpful. See Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 117. For example, he assures us that "the pattern
of manifest criminality... is not a theory of criminal types." Id. But Fletcher does not elaborate on
what a theory of criminal types would be.
27. Id. at 121.
28. Id. at 389.
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conduct as criminal., 29 I interpret this crucial remark to indicate that the patterns
identify distinct objects of punishment-different things that punishment might be
imposed for. In what I take to be a stipulation, Fletcher describes the various
things for which punishment might be imposed as cases of wrongdoing. He
characterizes "the element of wrongdoing [as] that aspect of criminal conduct for
which punishment is imposed."3 ° Patterns of liability, then, provide (what I call)
different modes of wrongdoing for which punishment might be imposed. In other
words, I construe Fletcher to contend that the genus of wrongdoing contains at
least three species; it is "plausible and coherent" to punish persons for their
criminal acts, their states of mind, or the harmful consequences their actions
cause." I explore the possible implications of my interpretation for a theory of
criminalization in Part II.
At this point, I employ this interpretation to try to understand Fletcher's32
apparent willingness to concede that additional patterns of liability may exist.

This concession is almost completely undeveloped and probably is intended as an
expression of caution. He can find no argument for concluding that his three
patterns are exhaustive of the core of criminal law, and neither can I. All that can
be done is to assess the merits of proposals to introduce new patterns of liability,
and nothing in Rethinking should be construed to insist that no fourth pattern

might be detected. What burden would an argument in favor of an additional
pattern have to satisfy?

On my interpretation, a new pattern would have to

identify something other than an act, state of mind, or consequence for which it
would be plausible and coherent to impose punishment.

Ultimately, of course, the question whether punishment may be imposed for
something-manifest criminality, subjective criminality, a harmful consequence,
or anything else-cannot be resolved without providing a theory of punishment.
Needless to say, philosophers have made countless attempts to defend such a

theory. Few of these philosophers, however, have shown much interest in the
substantive criminal law itself. Remarkably, they have tried to justify punishment
29. Id.
30. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 467.
31. I admit to some apprehension about this interpretation. Fletcher is unclear and sometimes even
inconsistent about his use of the term wrongdoing, which is introduced to contrast with wrongful
conduct-anotherstipulative term. He writes: "[W]e should be explicit about the distinction between
wrongful conduct and wrongdoing. The former is a purely formal concept, defined by the
incompatibility of the act with the norms of the legal system. The concept of wrongdoing is material or
substantive." Id. at 458. Yet he goes on to say that "[e]very wrongful act is at least a nominal case of
wrongdoing" and "[a]s a moral category,... wrongdoing is broader than the notion of wrongful
conduct." Id. This latter remark suggests that not every case of wrongdoing is a positive crime. For
present purposes, however, the converse is more important; not every positive crime is a case of
wrongdoing. Later, he claims that "punishment... is imposed only for a violation of norms directing
people how to conform to the law. The violation of the norm establishes the element of wrongdoing."
Id. at 468. Are we to suppose that wrongdoing is involved even when the laws punish behavior that is
not morally prohibited? No; Fletcher writes that "[i]f the norms are morally neutral ... it might be
plausible to use the more neutral term 'unlawful' behavior." Id. I fail to see how "unlawful behavior"
does not simply correspond to Fletcher's definition of wrongful conduct-a purely formal concept.
32. Fletcher claims to have shown that "at least three patterns of liability" exist. Fletcher, supra n.1,
at 389 (emphasis added). He also concedes, as we have seen, that several "major" offenses appear not
to conform to any of his three patterns. See supra nn. 20-23 and accompanying text.
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as though they could afford to ignore the issue of what punishment is imposed for.
In any event, little progress is made simply by noting that punishment is
necessarily backward-looking and retributive. 33 The details of a retributive theory
may further constrain what kinds of conduct are eligible for punishment. Any
such theory will be complex, reflecting the polycentric model of the substantive
34
criminal law embodied in the three patterns of liability Fletcher described.
In Rethinking, Fletcher devotes his most extended discussion to what might
be called benefits-and-burdens theories.35 According to these theories, a criminal
gains an unfair benefit relative to law-abiding citizens when he breaks the law.
Punishment is deserved because it somehow removes or negates the unfair
advantage taken by the criminal; it restores an equilibrium of benefits and
burdens. The implications of these retributive theories for the substantive
criminal law depend mostly on the nature of the unfair benefit alleged to be
gained by criminality. Many possible descriptions of this advantage have been
provided.36 On the most obvious but least plausible account, the unfair benefit is
the material gain to the offender-the fruits of his crime. He benefits, relative to
citizens who do not resort to theft, for example, by not having to pay for whatever
he has stolen. This characterization of his benefit works reasonably well for
property offenses, but it fails to explain why criminals deserve punishment when
they commit crimes from which they derive no material gain. In particular, it is
hard to see how this account can allow persons to be punished for crimes in the
pattern of subjective criminality.37 According to many philosophers, however, the
unfair advantage to the criminal is not his material gain. Instead, he benefits
simply by renouncing the burden of self-restraint, which law-abiding citizens have
assumed.3 8 This characterization solves the foregoing problem; all criminals gain
an unfair advantage. Even those who merely attempt or conspire to commit
crimes, for example, renounce a burden assumed by law-abiding citizens. For
good reason, however, Fletcher rejects this alternative. His entire approach is at
odds with positivists who hold that
a transgression of the rule in itself justifies criminal punishment. This thesis...
ignores the content of [the] rules defining criminal conduct. If accepted, the
33. Fletcher's definition of retribution is minimalist, disqualifying few theories of punishment.
"Retribution simply means that punishment is justified by virtue of its relationship to the offense that
has been committed." Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 416-17. Even consequentialists with "forward-looking"
accounts of punishment presumably adhere to the principle of legality and require that a crime be
committed by the defendant before the state may punish him in order to attain future goods. Thus
they differ only in the account of the relationship between punishment and offense that can justify
punishment. Subsequently, Fletcher embellishes his account of retributivism by indicating that it seeks
to impose punishment according to desert. Id. at 459-60.
34. "The ore of punishment is too rich to be sifted adequately in one light sweep." Id. at 419.
35. Not so long ago, such theories (which might also be called fairness theories) could be said to be
the most influential versions of retributivism. See generally David Dolinko, Some Thoughts about
Retributivism, 101 Ethics 537 (1991).
36. Various interpretations of the unfair advantage gained by criminality are distinguished in Richard W.
Burgh, Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?, 79 J. Phil. 193 (1982).
37. A few retributivists have tried to solve this problem. See e.g. Michael Davis, Why Attempts
Deserve Less Punishment Than Complete Crimes, 5 L. & Phil. 1 (1986).
38. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 475, 477 (1968).
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positivist thesis explains the entire criminal law .... If we take the content, and not
merely the form of the criminal law to be important, we should regard the positivist
thesis not as a challenge, but as an alternative that stands outside our realm of
discourse.39

Thus we are left without a statement of the material gain of criminality that
punishment could rectify. I conclude that benefits-and-burdens variants of
retributivism face formidable obstacles in justifying the punishment of persons
who commit crimes in each of Fletcher's three patterns. The ultimate problem of
grounding Fletcher's polycentric model of criminal law in a theory of punishment
remains unsolved.
In any event, several criminal theorists have tried to meet the challenge of
defending a new pattern of liability. Virtue theory-or what I think is better
described as vice theory-provides the most likely candidate for a fourth pattern.
In the past few years, the literature on this topic has mushroomed; positions are
too complex to be summarized easily. Suffice it to say that many commentators
have argued that, in some instances, criminal liability is and ought to be imposed
for a defect of character or vice.40 Others are unpersuaded; 41 some go to great
lengths to explain how their views do not commit them to punishing defects of
character.42 I am reluctant to admit that vice provides an additional pattern of
liability, that is, something distinct for which punishment should be imposed. But
surely there is nothing incoherent about the claim that liability may be imposed
for vice; we cannot say that punishment for a defect of character is somehow
unintelligible.
Although Fletcher himself does not explicitly entertain the possibility that
vice may provide a distinct pattern of liability, he famously explores (and
seemingly endorses) the view that judgments about character are central to an
adequate theory of excuses. His statement of the argument is that "(1) punishing
wrongful conduct is just only if punishment is measured by the desert of the
offender, [and] (2) the desert of an offender is gauged by his character-i.e., the
kind of person he is. ... ,,4'This character theory of excuses has been hotly
debated."a At present, however, my narrow question is whether plausible grounds
can be provided for confining the boundaries of this theory to the realm of
excuses. As formulated above, the second premise seems applicable to the whole
of the criminal law, and not merely to a subcategory of defenses. If the
determination of whether persons deserve punishment is really a function of their
character, it is only a short step to concluding that vice should be relevant to the

39. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 234.
40. See e.g. Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423, 1425 (1995).
41. See e.g. R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian Criminal
Law?, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 147, 148 (2002).
42. See e.g. Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable Indifference" Simply Punish for
"Bad Character"?: Examining the Requisite Connection between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 Buff.
Crim. L. Rev. 219, 225 (2002).
43. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 800.
44. See R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,and CriminalLiability, 12 L. & Phil. 345, 346 (1993).
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content of criminal offenses-not simply to whether persons are excused for
committing these offenses.45 If this short step is taken, vice may emerge as yet a
fourth pattern of liability-as something punishment should be imposed for.
Two familiar and related difficulties plague the view that punishment may be
imposed for vice, in addition to two problems that have received relatively little
attention. First, this view struggles to explain why each imposition of criminal
liability requires conduct. If punishment (sometimes or always) were really
inflicted for vice, why do statutes not proscribe vice directly, without the need for
a particular criminal act? 46 Ideally, I suppose, vice theory recommends the radical
redrafting of criminal codes to impose liability explicitly for defects of character,
whether or not these traits are manifested in wrongful behavior. Second, why
should we accept the minimal evidence of vice that is revealed by a single criminal
act? 47 If persons are to be punished for their vices-a drastic state response that
must satisfy a demanding standard of justification-we should require more
persuasive evidence of vice than any single act could provide.48 If so, what
principled grounds can prevent the inquiry from expanding into an assessment of
the whole agent?
In addition, vice theory encounters two difficulties that are discussed less
frequently but seem no less damaging. First, no existing jurisdiction comes close
to incorporating a theory of vice into the content of its substantive criminal law.
On any plausible theory of virtue and vice, remarkably few instances of the
latter-or actions that manifest or provide evidence of vice-are subject to
criminal liability. Commentators who defend vice theories have the formidable
challenge of explaining why some but not all defects of character are or ought to
be punished. 49 Finally, vice theory seemingly presupposes the existence of
relatively robust and stable traits of character. To be sure, the empirical
commitments made by particular versions of vice theory are debatable. Empirical
research indicates, however, that robust and stable traits of character may be far
less common than folk psychology suggests. °

45. John Gardner contends that the standards by which we judge actions to be dishonest, for
example, are exactly those by which we judge persons to be dishonest. See John Gardner, The Gist of
Excuses, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 575,575 (1998).
46. Many commentators have pressed this objection. See e.g. Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,
and Excuse, in Crime, Culpability, and Remedy 29 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., Basil Blackwell
1990).
47. My formulation of this question presupposes that the relation between criminal acts and vice
must be evidential. Although other accounts of this relation have been given, I am dubious of their
success.
48. Fletcher suggests that the principle of legality precludes us from obtaining more reliable
evidence of character than a single act could provide. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 800-01. I suspect,
however, that those who really believe that punishment is imposed for vice would simply reject
whatever conception of the principle of legality prevents the inquiry from expanding into an
assessment of the whole agent.
49. For many nice examples, see Leo Katz, Villainy and Felony: A Problem Concerning
Criminalization,6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 451 (2002).
50. See John M. Doris, Lack of Character:Personality and Moral Behavior 111 (Cambridge U. Press
2002).
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Perhaps these several difficulties can be evaded or solved, and vice will
assume its place alongside manifest criminality, subjective criminality, and harmful
consequences as a fourth pattern of liability. 5 ' No one can predict that additional
patterns will not emerge as viable candidates for modes of wrongdoing for which
punishment may be imposed.52 Again, I do not insist that the criminal law cannot
be even more polycentric than Fletcher acknowledged. However many patterns
of liability should ultimately be countenanced, it is time to explore the normative
implications of these patterns for the content of the substantive criminal law.

II.

How THE PATFERNS LIMIT THE CRIMINAL LAW

Whenever I see Fletcher, I chide him for his failure to address issues of
criminalization-a set of principles that limit the scope of the criminal sanction.
How can an 898-page opus devote so little attention to the topic of when the
criminal law is used legitimately or illegitimately-or how this distinction should
be drawn? This neglect is puzzling, since Fletcher begins Rethinking by
contending that the "central question" of criminal law is "justifying the use of the
state's coercive power against free and autonomous persons. 53 If this question is
really central-and difficult-there must be countless situations in which the use
of the state's coercive power against free and autonomous persons is not justified.
What are they?
We should not be surprised that positivists have little to say about this topic.
If the criminal law has whatever shape and form the legislature chooses to give it,
its content is subject to no constraints at all-except, I suppose, to those that can
be derived from the Constitution. We all know, however, that the Constitution
imposes very few such constraints. 4 Still, this failure is peculiar in Rethinking. As
I have indicated, the unifying theme in virtually all of Fletcher's work-which
makes it relevant to philosophers-is that the criminal law has an internal
structure that is not simply created by the legislators.5 Positivists have no choice

51. I am aware that some commentators have far more ambitious aspirations. They contend that
vice theory should replace, rather than supplement, many or all of Fletcher's patterns. I remain
convinced, however, that Fletcher's polycentric model is correct. The question, then, is not whether,
but to what extent, the criminal law is polycentric.
52. Arguably, the use of criminal liability to punish persons for future dangerousness rather than for
past conduct represents a fifth distinct pattern. I have no doubt that such impositions of the criminal
sanction are objectionable on many grounds. I disagree, however, that their use is somehow precluded
by the logic of punishment. Paul Robinson cites Webster's Dictionary to support his contention that
"one cannot logically 'punish' dangerousness." Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness:Cloaking
Preventative Detention as CriminalJustice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429, 1432 (2001). Contrary to the thrust
of Robinson's argument, however, one can punish persons for being dangerous, or for having the
characteristics that make one dangerous. On this interpretation, preventive detention punishes
persons for properties that probably qualify as vices. If so, this alleged fifth pattern of liability can be
subsumed under vice theory.
53. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at xix.
54. See Stephen Shute, With and Without Constitutional Restraints: A Comparison between the
CriminalLaw of Englandand America, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 329 (1998). Shute contends that "[t]here
are in fact only five constitutional provisions which are directly on point" in limiting "the permissible
content of the substantive criminal law." Id. at 333. Curiously, Shute omits the Second Amendment.
55. See text accompanying supra n. 3.
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but to trust the good sense of prosecutors to rectify whatever injustice results from
the nearly unlimited power they bestow upon the legislative branch. Fletcher,
however, is unwilling to "retreat to prosecutorial discretion as a surrogate for the
principled solution of human conflict.,1 6 Instead, principled solutions are to be
found within the internal structure of criminal law itself.
For the most part, I continue to believe that my criticism of Fletcher is
accurate; Rethinking suffers from insufficient explicit attention to the principled
limits of the criminal sanction. Even the harm requirement-perhaps the most
familiar attempt to narrow the boundaries of the criminal law-is treated
unsympathetically. Fletcher apparently regards the concept of harm as "infinitely
expandable, 57 and wonders whether the harm requirement is "subject to
falsification. 5 8 His skepticism may be warranted, 59 but I suspect he abandons the
search for a substantive, non-vacuous account of harm too quickly. 60 If Fletcher
had surrendered with so little resistance elsewhere, Rethinking would not be the
subject of an issue commemorating its impact today. 61 Indeed, many of the most
important claims and distinctions defended throughout Rethinking become
problematic if the concept of harm were irreparably vague and elastic. Even
Fletcher's characterizations of at least two of his three patterns of liability assume
that a substantive account of harm must be available. Obviously, we cannot make
sense of a pattern of harmful consequences unless we are able to recognize some
consequences as harms.
Less obviously, paradigm cases of subjective
criminality-like the inchoate crime of attempt-also presuppose an analysis of
harm. As Fletcher is aware, "[w]ithout a general theory of harms that ought to be
prevented, one can hardly develop a ranking of offenses as complete and
inchoate., 62 Although this statement is true, I would go further: without a general
theory of harms that ought to be prevented, one can hardly develop a theory of
the criminal law. More precisely, one can hardly develop a theory of the criminal
law that is responsive to Fletcher's "central question" of specifying the conditions
under which coercive power may be employed against free and autonomous
persons.

56. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 769.
57. Id. at 404.
5& Id.
59. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle,90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 109,
113 (1999).
60. Since the publication of Rethinking, the most important interpretations and defenses of the
harm requirement are provided by Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford U. Press 1984), and Joseph
Raz, Autonomy, Toleration, and the Harm Principle,in Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The
Influence of H.L.A. Hart313 (Ruth Gavison ed., Clarendon Press 1987).
61. Consider, for example, the concept of a legal interest-which seems no less vague or immune to
falsification than harm. As Fletcher indicates,
The place to search for a scale of wrongdoing is the range of legal interests that are either
violated or threatened by wrongful acts.... Thus evaluating wrongdoing requires both a
ranking of legal interests and a technique for estimating degrees of proximity and
remoteness from the violation of the interest.
Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 472-73.
62. Id. at 133.
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Nonetheless, I have come to believe that the resources for a substantial part
of a theory of criminalization might be found in Rethinking. In what follows, I
propose to examine the normative significance of his three patterns of liability in
the hope of drawing a few implications about the limits of the criminal sanction. I
do not know whether Fletcher himself would be amenable to my suggestions. But
many important insights have even more explanatory power than their authors
realize, and I suspect this to be the case with Fletcher's thesis that the criminal law
can be analyzed in terms of his three patterns of liability.
Before proceeding further, it is important to appreciate the urgent need for
limitations on the scope of the criminal sanction. The criminal law has undergone
enormous transformation in the twenty-five years since the publication of
Rethinking. Remarkably, few criminal theorists-or philosophers of criminal
law-have tended to pay much attention to these developments.63 Criminal codes6
are rarely read, even by those who purport to theorize about them.
Commentators remain obsessed with the so-called general part, and typically write
as though the criminal law still contains only those core offenses discussed by
Fletcher. According to William Stuntz, however, the criminal law has now
become "not one field but two. The first consists of a few core crimes ....The
second consists of everything else. Criminal law courses, criminal law literature,
and popular conversation about crime focus heavily on the first. The second
dominates criminal codes." 65 Since the influence of Rethinking has been so
pervasive, I doubt that so little attention to questions of criminalization would
have been paid had Fletcher confronted the issue more directly.
In any event, changes in the criminal law have been dramatic-so dramatic,
in fact, that a theorist might conclude that the whole model Fletcher advanced has
become obsolete, applicable to an earlier era when the criminal law was simpler
and more manageable. 66 I reject this pessimistic view, although I think its
plausibility should not be dismissed out of hand. After all, criminal theorists
purport to be theorizing about the criminal law. At some point, their efforts are
no longer recognizable as theories about the criminal law we actually have, but
rather as theories about the criminal law we would prefer to have. Arguably, this
point has already been reached. 67 Despite these reservations, I propose to
examine whether Fletcher has given us the resources to oppose any of the recent
changes I will discuss. Even if this exercise is unlikely to stimulate reform in the

63. "Most criminal law scholars.., pay surprisingly little attention to the actual state of the
law .... Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 219,
224 (2003).
64. William J.Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505,512 (2001).
65. Id.
66. Or perhaps the "good old days" when the model was applicable are myths that never really
existed. See generally Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
Mich. L. Rev. 1269 (1998).
67. Few theorists are ready to throw in the towel, but many seem resigned to the possibility that we
will never return to the era in which the criminal law tended to show greater respect for the general
principles of justice these commentators hold dear. See Andrew Ashworth, Is the Criminal Law a Lost
Cause?, 116 L.Q. Rev. 225 (2000).
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real world, 68 I hope it is not utterly without value. At the very least, my project
may help to identify some of the characteristics of a criminal law to which our
reforms should aspire.
To begin, I will try to briefly summarize some of the most significant
developments in criminal law. Douglas Berman lists five important changes that
have taken place in the field of criminal justice since the completion of the Model
Penal Code. 69 He notes:
First, the.., criminal law has become highly politicized ....
Second, the
investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses has been "constitutionalized" by
judicial decisions ....
Third, the sentencing of criminal offenders has been
"legalized" by legislatures and commissions through the enactment of mandatory
sentencing statutes and sentencing guidelines ....
Fourth, the treatment of
wrongdoing has been "civilized" by the broad use of sanctions like forfeiture and
involuntary civil commitment ....
Fifth, the scale of punishments, prison
populations and the economic costs of our justice systems have been "supersized .....
,,70

I have no doubt that Berman's list captures the most important trends in criminal
justice in the past three decades. Yet only the first directly affects the content of
the substantive criminal law itself-the law Fletcher rethought twenty-five years
ago. 71
The single most visible development in the substantive criminal law is that
the sheer number of criminal offenses has grown exponentially. Perhaps theorists
have paid relatively little attention to this explosive growth because its true
dimensions are difficult to quantify. Since much of this expansion consists of
amendments to existing statutes, we cannot meaningfully say that the number of
crimes has doubled, tripled, or multiplied tenfold. Still, we can count the words or
pages in criminal codes to demonstrate the trend. Paul Robinson and Michael
Cahill employ this method to illustrate the expansion of the criminal code of
Illinois72 -even though commentators (including Robinson himself) tend to rank
the overall quality of this particular state code as well above average.73 In 1961,
the Illinois code contained less than 24,000 words; by 2003, that number had

68. The standard complaint among those theorists who are aware of the trends I will recount is that
legislatures and courts ignore us. Fletcher recommends that "[p]olicy makers in the field of criminal
justice should pay more attention to academic criticism." George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of
Criminal Theory, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 275, 281 (1998).
69. Douglas A. Berman, The Model Penal Code Second: Might "Film Schools" Be in Need of a
Remake?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 163, 164-65 (2003).
70. Id.
71. I say that only the first of these developments directly affects the content of the substantive
criminal law because others-most notably the second-have done so indirectly. The impact of
criminal procedure on the content of the substantive criminal law is explored in a series of articles by
William Stuntz. See e.g. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship between Criminal Procedure and
CriminalJustice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997).
72. Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from
Themselves?, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 169, 172 n. 16 (2003).
73. See Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1 (2000).
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swelled to more than 136,000-a six-fold increase.74 This figure tends to
understate the expansion of criminal offenses, since many crimes now are
contained outside criminal codes themselves-a phenomenon that threatens to
undermine the principle of legality, as Fletcher recognized in Rethinking.75
In my judgment, no commentator has done more both to describe as well as
76
I
to explain the growth of the substantive criminal law than William Stuntz.
concur with his observation that "anyone who studies contemporary state or
federal criminal codes is likely to be struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of
conduct they render punishable. 7 7 As a result, we are steadily moving "closer to
a world in which the law on the books makes everyone a felon., 78 Nothing that
should be dignified with the name of a theory drives this expansion; "American
criminal law's historical development has borne no relation to any plausible
normative theory-unless 'more' counts as a normative theory., 79 Because of this
phenomenal growth, enforcement is necessarily selective, leading Stuntz to
identify prosecutors rather than legislators as "the criminal justice system's real
lawmakers."0 Commentators like Fletcher-who attach great importance to
preserving the principle of legality and are suspicious of the discretion that
inevitably accompanies increases in prosecutorial power-should vehemently
oppose these developments.
Statistics and large-scale trends aside, how might we generalize about the
content of these new crimes? This task is daunting. It is easy to provide numerous
examples of crimes that seem to have no place in modem criminal codes. Many
laws-like Maine's prohibition of catching crustaceans with anything but
conventional lobster traps, or the federal government's ban on using the "Give a
hoot, don't pollute" slogan without authorization-fail what Erik Luna calls the
"laugh test." 81 The challenge for theorists, however, is not simply to list these new
crimes, but to place them into meaningful categories for analysis. The project is to
decide what general kinds of crimes represent unjustifiable impositions of the
penal sanction. Once we move outside the core to the periphery of criminal law,
we lack a familiar conceptual apparatus to classify many of the new kinds of
offenses that have been enacted. In what follows, I will describe what I regard as
three kinds of recent innovations: overlapping offenses, crimes of risk prevention,
and ancillary offenses. I make no pretense that my categories are precise or
74. Robinson & Cahill, supra n. 72, at 172 n. 16.
75. Fletcher's worries are discussed in the context of his discussion of liability for omissions. See
Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 628-31. According to some commentators, these concerns about legality are
even more pronounced in the context of possessory offenses. See Markus Dirk Dubber, The
Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and the Police Model of the Criminal Process, in Defining
Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law's Special Part (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., Oxford U. Press
forthcoming 2005).
76. See e.g. Stuntz, supra n. 64.
77. Id. at 515.
78. Id. at 511.
79. Id. at 508.
80. Id. at 506.
81. See Erik Luna, Overextending the Criminal Law, 25 Cato Policy Rpt. 1, 1 (Nov./Dec. 2003)
(available at <http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy-report/v25n6/luna.pdf>).
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exhaustive. Admittedly, many crimes of risk prevention overlap, and some
ancillary offenses may be designed to prevent risk. Still, I contend that my crude
categories are somewhat helpful in allowing us to begin the task of distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate uses of the criminal law.
I call the first category overlapping crimes. According to Stuntz, "federal
and state codes alike are filled with overlapping crimes, such that a single criminal
incident typically violates a half dozen or more prohibitions., 82 We understand
the social dynamic that spawns many of these offenses; several commentators have
complained about the extent to which our legislative process has become
politicized. 8' A sensationalistic tragedy attracts extraordinary media attention,
and officials pledge to "do something" to prevent similar events in the future. All
too often, this "something" consists of the enactment of a new statute. When
these statutes proscribe harmful and culpable conduct that was previously
noncriminal, the additions are welcome and necessary. Such cases, however, are
unusual. More typically, the original conduct was already criminalized, and the
new offense simply describes the proscribed behavior more specifically. As a
result, codes have come to contain several overlapping offenses, with newer, more
specific statutes supplementing older, more generic offenses.
But most overlapping crimes have not originated from sensationalistic media
coverage. Robinson and Cahill provide several mundane examples of this
phenomenon from the criminal code of Illinois. Although the Illinois code has
long contained a general offense of damaging property, recent statutes proscribe
damaging library materials, damaging an animal facility, defacing delivery
containers, and (their personal favorite) damaging anhydrous ammonia
equipment. 84 Presumably, similar overlapping offenses can be found in nearly
every state code throughout the United States, and probably are even more
common in federal law. Although the federal criminal code has a generic false
statement statute that prohibits lies in matters under federal jurisdiction, it also
contains a bewildering maze of statutes banning lies in specified settings.
According to one commentator, there are exactly 325 separate federal statutes
proscribing fraud or misrepresentation.
As long as these overlapping offenses contain distinct elements, current
interpretations of double jeopardy doctrine do not preclude the state from
bringing several charges simultaneously, even though, from the intuitive
perspective of a layperson, the defendant has committed a single crime.86 Thus the
main effect of these overlapping offenses is to allow "charge-stacking" and
82. Stuntz, supra n. 64, at 507.
83. See e.g. Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political,Social, Psychological and
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 23 (1997).
84. Robinson & Cahill, supra n. 72, at 170.
85. Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 249, 289 (1998).
86. To be sure, some criminal theorists have tried to block this result by arguing for reforms in
double jeopardy doctrine. See e.g. Michael S. Moore, Act and Crime: The Philosophyof Action and Its
Implicationsfor CriminalLaw 305-90 (Clarendon Press 1993).
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87
thereby subject defendants to more severe punishments.
As a consequence,
88
guilty.
plead
to
incentives
defendants have greater
A second category of relatively new crimes might be called offenses of riskprevention. The proliferation of these offenses has contributed to the phenomenal
growth of the criminal law. After all, the state has long proscribed just about
every possible means of causing direct harm. But there is virtually no limit to how
far the state might go in protecting persons from novel ways that harm might be
risked. Offenses of risk prevention are examples of inchoate offenses. Roughly,
an offense is inchoate when some but not all of its instances cause harm. More
precisely, tokens of the criminal act-type need not bring about the harm or evil the
law is designed to prevent. 8' These offenses do not proscribe harm itself, but
rather the possibility of harm-a possibility that need not (and typically does not)
materialize when the offense is committed. 90
R.A. Duff has provided the most detailed taxonomy of offenses of riskprevention. 9' According to Duff, these crimes may be general or specific, basic or
aggravated, primary or secondary, direct or indirect, explicit or implicit. For
present purposes, I will focus on the last distinction. An offense of risk-prevention
is explicit

when the definition of the offense makes explicit reference to the relevant risk, so
that their commission requires the actual creation of that risk; they are implicit when
their definition makes no such explicit reference, so that they can be committed
without the relevant risk (the risk that justified their creation) actually being
created .9
Duff lists reckless driving as an example of an offense of explicit risk-prevention,
although I doubt that this is literally correct. Presumably, the risk to be prevented
by this offense is the personal injury and property damage caused by a crash, even
though the definition of the offense does identify this risk explicitly. Perhaps he
regards reckless driving as an example of an explicit offense of risk-prevention
because the nature of the risk is obvious, and not because it is expressly
mentioned. In any event, Duff's example of an offense of implicit risk creationillicit drug possession-is better. Presumably, this crime is designed to prevent
some risk(s) or another, although the nature of that risk is not identified in the
statute itself.
A third category of recent crimes might be called ancillary offenses. This
term, I believe, was introduced by Norman Abrams-who immediately

87. See Stuntz, supra n. 64, at 520.
88. In federal courts, 64,558 of 68,156 convictions were obtained by guilty pleas in 2000. See Bureau
of J. Statistics, supra n. 7, at 414 tbl. 5.17.
89. For further discussion, see Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate
Offenses, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151 (1995).
90. In some (but not all) cases, the occurrence of the harm that is risked actually precludes liability
for the inchoate offense. For example, liability for an attempt merges with the completed offense, and
thus cannot be imposed if the attempt is successful.
91. See Duff, supra n. 18.
92. Id. at (m.s. 11) (footnote omitted).
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apologized for its imprecision-and I draw heavily from his insights here. 93
Roughly, ancillary offenses are those that bear an indirect relation to core
offenses. They are used when a defendant is believed to have committed a core
offense, but prosecution is unlikely to be successful or is otherwise deemed to be
undesirable. On some occasions, the state cannot prove the commission of the
core offense, or its evidence of the core offense is inadmissible because it has been
obtained illegally. These occasions have led to the enactment of growing numbers
of ancillary offenses that surround core offenses.
Abrams divides ancillary offenses into several kinds. 94 The first are
derivative crimes, which typically proscribe "aidlike" conduct that occurs after the
commission of a core offense. Money laundering statutes provide an example. 95
Prior to the enactment of federal money-laundering statutes, a defendant
committed a single crime by robbing a bank and depositing the funds in his own
account. Subsequently, he may be guilty of at least two crimes. The activity
resembles an ordinary commercial transaction; what transforms it into a crime is
the mental state of the defendant and the fact that the money has been derived
from specified kinds of criminal conduct. His second category is enforcement and
information-gatheringoffenses. These crimes are committed in the course of a law
enforcement investigation directed toward a core offense, or involve a failure to
provide required information that might have lead to an investigation of such an
offense. Abrams's example is the Bank Secrecy Act, 96 which makes it a crime for
a financial institution to omit to file a report on any bank transaction exceeding a
given amount. Again, bank employees may be processing a fairly routine
transaction, but the statute criminalizes their failure to report it to the proper
authorities.
I repeat that my efforts to categorize the massive numbers of new criminal
offenses do not demonstrate much sophistication or ingenuity. The distinctions
between overlapping crimes, offenses of risk-prevention, and ancillary offenses
are at least as vague and imprecise as those between Fletcher's three patterns of
liability. My objective is to explore whether and to what extent the normative
significance of these patterns can be used to generate a substantial part of a theory
of criminalization that can be brought to bear in resisting some of the foregoing
developments. In the remainder of this essay, I will defend the hypothesis that
Fletcher's patterns can be used for this very purpose.
The argument proceeds as follows. The most important difference between
the criminal law and other bodies of law, or systems of social control that are not
modes of law at all, is that the former subjects offenders to punishment. Unless
punishment is a possible sanction that can be imposed on individuals who violate

93. See Norman Abrams, The New Ancillary Offenses, 1 Crim. L. Forum 1 (1989).
94. In addition to the two categories of ancillary offenses I describe here, Abrams includes a third,
which he names catchallcrimes. Id. at 24. The fact that this label is so unhelpful underscores the need
for a better taxonomy of ancillary crimes.
95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (2000).
96. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970).
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given rules, we would not describe those rules as belonging to the criminal law.97
Of course, it is notoriously difficult to decide when state responses to rule
violations are modes of punishment, and the expanded use of innovative
sanctions-such as asset forfeiture-compound the problem of trying to identify
offenses as criminal. 98 Although the exact nature of punishment is controversial,
all commentators agree that inflictions of punishment require justification.99 If the
foregoing claims are correct, our justification of punishment provides limits on the
kinds of conduct that may be criminalized. These limitations arise because the
criminal law is never wholly effective. Criminalized conduct that subjects
offenders to punishment is proscribed, but not always prevented. Some persons
will engage in the proscribed conduct, whatever the law might say. 1'0 But if the
law in question is really a criminal law, these offenders will become subject to
punishment. Is the punishment of such persons justified? Notice that this
question would lack urgency if the mere act of proscribing conduct could
effectively prevent it. In a world of perfect compliance, no one would have to be
punished. In our world of imperfect compliance, however, the implications for
criminalization are apparent. Before legislators enact a criminal law, they had
better be confident that the state would be justified in punishing persons who
violate it. In other words, the state should not create crimes that will subject
offenders to punishment unless it has good reason to believe that the punishment
to which such persons will become subject would be justified. If we cannot justify
the punishment of those who commit a given offense, we should not enact that
offense in the first place. Enactment of such an offense will require the state to
impose punishments we have not or cannot justify, or to renege on its
classification of that law as criminal.
I suggest, then, that the most basic question that must be answered by our
theory of criminalization is: For what conduct may persons be punished?'

Whenever the justifiability of a particular offense is called into question, it is
crucial to ask: may punishment be imposed for it? When construed normatively,
Fletcher's patterns of liability are designed to answer this very question. Although
we have no "single formula for determining when conduct ought to be treated as

97. "[T]he institution of punishment provides the distinguishing features of criminal law." George
P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of CriminalLaw 25 (Oxford U. Press 1998).
98. Innovative sanctions include expatriation, deportation, denaturalization, citizenship revocation,
the detention and adjudication of juvenile delinquents, "civil" commitment of the dangerous mentally
ill, the pretrial detention of criminal defendants, civil contempt orders, and the like. For a discussion,
see Carol S. Steiker, Punishmentand Procedure:Punishment Theory and the Criminal-CivilProcedural
Divide, 85 Geo. L.J. 775 (1997).
99. When the hardships are severe, the standard of justification is high. See Sherry F. Colb,
Freedom from Incarceration:Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
781 (1994).
100. This claim is empirical, not logical. Conceivably, compliance with a proscription could be
universal.
101. Legal moralism is perhaps the main rival to my approach. According to legal moralists, the
most basic question that must be answered by our theory of criminalization is: What conduct is
immoral? For the most sophisticated defense of legal moralism, see Moore, supra n. 2.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2
TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:755

criminal,' ' 2 the patterns represent distinct modes of wrongdoing for which
punishment is plausibly and coherently inflicted. As the existence of hybrids
demonstrates, we need not answer this question by identifying a single pattern of
liability to which a given offense conforms. Punishment might be imposed for
some complex combination of act, mental state, and harmful consequence. But
we should be skeptical of attempts to locate wrongfulness anywhere outside of
these patterns. What else besides act, mental state, or consequence might
punishments be inflicted for? The burden is on legislators to explain why crimes
that deviate from these patterns-crimes outside the core-justifiably subject
offenders to punishment.
If I am correct, offenses are not part of the core of the criminal law simply
because they conform to one or more of Fletcher's patterns of liability. Instead,
offenses are part of the core because they conform to patterns that state a
plausible and coherent basis for punishment. This device for identifying core
offenses is not circular or tautological. It provides a basis for claiming that some
of Fletcher's patterns should be deleted (as those who oppose the pattern of
harmful consequences recommend) or that others should be added (as vice
theorists propose) to our normative theory of criminal law. The consequences of
my interpretation are far-reaching. Crimes outside the core-on what I have
called the periphery-are not of a kind for which a coherent and plausible basis
for punishment has been given. As far as I can see, this is no different from saying
that crimes outside the core should not be crimes at all. Of course, we should not
infer that no justification for these crimes can be given from the premise that none
has been given. But we should have a justification before we resort to
punishment; the mere hope that a justification will someday be found is
insufficient.
Does Fletcher himself use his patterns for this purpose? I am unsure.
Consider, however, his (admittedly cursory) remarks about strict liability
offenses-those that dispense with mens rea for at least one material element.
Theorists who reserve punishment for wrongdoing typically oppose these offenses.
Fletcher's own position is more subtle. He does not argue that wrongdoing 0is3
irrelevant, but that wrongdoing may be present despite the absence of mens rea.'
When strict liability offenses are justifiable, the defendant's fault "is presumed
from the violation of the norm."' '° He mentions statutes proscribing the
distribution of adulterated drugs to illustrate this phenomenon.
My own
interpretation of his strategy is that impositions of strict liability, when justified,
conform to the pattern of manifest criminality. We must be able to infer

102. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at xxii.
103. Many subsequent commentators have contended that wrongdoing may be present despite the
absence of culpability for each material element by distinguishing formal from substantive impositions
of strict liability. See e.g. Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, and Proportionality,in Appraising
Strict Liability (A.P. Simester ed., Oxford U. Press forthcoming 2005); Kenneth W. Simons, When Is
Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1075 (1997).
104. Fletcher, supra n. 1, at 469.
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wrongdoing from the proscribed act itself.10 5 But in cases in which the inference to
fault from the violation of the norm should not be presumed-surely a very
realistic possibility-I am confident that Fletcher would join the chorus of those
commentators who oppose the imposition of strict liability. '0
Consider also the reservation I have mentioned about some of the "major
crimes" that Fletcher alleges fall outside the core of the criminal law. Incest and
adultery are among his examples. Some commentators would not shrink from
consigning these crimes to the pattern of manifest criminality. Surely (they would
say) sex within biological families or with a person other than one's spouse is
wrongful on its face. Fletcher's ambivalence, I assume, reflects his unwillingness
to subscribe to the substantive morality that would condemn these behaviors as
cases of wrongdoing. The problem, then, is not that these crimes are perfectly
legitimate uses of the criminal sanction, even though they conform to none of
Fletcher's three patterns of liability. Instead, I would conclude that if these crimes
conform to no discernable pattern-if they are not genuine cases of wrongdoing
according to our best account of what wrongdoing may be-the better response is
to call for their repeal. 0 7
The case of justifiable strict liability, which must be assigned into an existing
pattern, and the examples of incest and adultery, which I believe cannot be
squeezed into any pattern, reveal once again the formidable problems in deciding
how to place particular offenses in given categories. I do not intend to minimize
these problems. At the same time, I do not believe they should be exaggerated;
some crimes cannot plausibly be thought to conform to any pattern. Consider, for
example, a statute that proscribes the possession of something intended to be used
for the purpose of creating a mental state. In California, for example, "[a]ny
person who possesses nitrous oxide ... with the intent to breathe, inhale, or ingest
for the purpose of causing a condition of intoxication, elation, euphoria, dizziness,
stupefaction, or dulling of the senses.., is guilty of a misdemeanor.' 08 What
mode of wrongdoing could possibly be described here? I cannot imagine how an
argument to assign this offense to a pattern of liability would proceed.
In what follows, I will put aside strict liability, crimes of dubious
wrongfulness, and statutes that probably fail the laugh test. We must address the
more general issue of how a theory of criminalization derived from the patterns of
liability would apply to the three categories of new offenses I have described.
First, consider overlapping offenses. Admittedly, I cannot see how Fletcher's

105. Perhaps this inference from proscribed act to wrongdoing must only be sufficiently compelling
to shift the burden onto defendants to show that their particular act does not involve wrongdoing. See
Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 401
(1993).
106. When is this inference unwarranted?
For a possible answer, see Alan C. Michaels,
ConstitutionalInnocence, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 828 (1999).
107. As a matter of political reality, of course, offenses are hard to repeal, and demands to do so may
galvanize remaining support in their favor. The politically feasible alternative, then-however
uncomfortable to the theorist-is to allow these statutes to fall into disuse. See Martin J. Siegel, For
Better orfor Worse: Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. Fam. L. 45 (1991-1992).
108. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 381b (West 1999).
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views are especially helpful in retarding the proliferation of these kinds of crimes.
Suppose the generic offense falls squarely within the core of the criminal law,
conforming to one pattern or another. Any more specific offense that is enacted
would presumably conform to the very same pattern as its generic predecessor. I
have no doubt that Fletcher himself is unhappy about the perversion of criminal
justice that often results from the charge-stacking made possible by these
overlapping offenses. But I can find little in Rethinking-and nothing in his
patterns of liability-to oppose this development.' 9 To be sure, massive
confusion surrounds the issue of how severely defendants should be punished
when they are convicted of multiple offenses derived from the same underlying
conduct. 110 But a theory of proportionality in punishment rather than a theory of
the limits of the substantive criminal law seems more likely to offer a solution to
this difficult problem.
The prospects for retarding the growth of the criminal law in my second
category-crimes of risk-prevention-are a good deal more promising. Many of
these crimes fall outside any of Fletcher's three patterns. By definition, no harm
need be caused. In some instances-as when a culpability term is used to define
the prohibited conduct-the act may manifest dangerousness on its face. No one
can pretend, for example, that dangerous driving is not dangerous. But in many
cases of what Duff calls crimes of implicit risk-prevention, the conduct cannot be
said to manifest dangerousness. When no specific risk is identified, defendants
can be (and often are) liable notwithstanding their complete absence of culpability
with respect to whatever risk the statute is designed to prevent. The problem, as I
would express it, is that such statutes are overinclusive."' They are designed to
prevent persons from creating a risk, even though a given individual may satisfy
the definition of the offense without creating that risk at all. In such cases, it is
equally clear that the crimes do not conform to the pattern of subjective
criminality.
To illustrate this problem, consider crimes involving drug paraphernalia.
Presumably, these statutes are enacted to reduce a given risk, even though that
risk is not mentioned in the statute itself. We should resist the temptation to
suppose that the risk to be prevented is the possession and eventual use of illicit
drugs. In the first place, drug use itself is best conceptualized as an offense of riskprevention; it is proscribed because it creates a subsequent risk." 2 Moreover,
many states include among their drug offenses the proscription of substances that
cannot be used to create these risks because they are not really drugs; the
substances are merely possessed "[u]nder circumstances which would lead a

109. I do not mean to suggest that Fletcher has nothing instructive to say about disproportionate
punishments.
110. For some helpful suggestions, see Michael T. Cahill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability:
New Challenges for a Model Penal Code Second, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 599 (2004).
111. For a seminal discussion of overinclusive and underinclusive rules, see Frederick Schauer,
Playing by the Rules: A PhilosophicalExamination of Rule-Based Decision-Makingin Law and in Life
(Clarendon Press 1991).
112. See Douglas N. Husak, Drugs and Rights (Cambridge U. Press 1992).
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reasonable person to believe"113
they are drugs. In any event, it is clear that one
can commit a drug paraphernalia offense even though he does not create whatever
risk(s) the law is designed to prevent. Federal law proscribes the sale of given
items when they are primarily for use or "designed for use"'1 4 with controlled
substances. This statute is construed to apply to items that sellers are aware their
customers in general are likely to use with drugs, even though particular
customers never actually use, and never intended to use, the items for this
purpose."1 5 The law of many states also prohibits the (knowing) possession of drug
paraphernalia.1 1 6 Many individuals who commit this offense will not use the
paraphernalia in a subsequent drug offense. Suppose a person acquired a
proscribed item when he was actively using drugs, but his "drug career" has long
ended. If he did not dispose of the paraphernalia (for whatever reason), it is hard
to see how his possession creates a risk. Yet (unless he is saved by the exercise of
discretion) he is subject to punishment. In the absence of a harmful consequence,
manifest criminality, or subjective criminality, I fail to understand what
punishment in such a case is imposed for.1 17 In other words, I fail to understand
how punishment is justified.
How might we modify offenses of risk-prevention to avoid the problem of
overinclusion? The most obvious but least practical solution is to ensure that the
very individuals who are banned from the risky activity are those who pose the
risk in question. Although the individualized tests required to implement this
solution would often be cumbersome, the resulting scheme would not be
overinclusive. A more manageable way to achieve this result would be to enact
offenses that require defendants to act with a high degree of culpability with
respect to the harm to be prevented. The criminal law employs this device when
imposing liability for the most well-known inchoate offenses. A person should not
be guilty of attempting to commit a crime, for example, unless he intends to
commit that crime. 1 8 Even though many of these persons would not actually
succeed in causing harm, there is good reason to think that all of them pose a risk
and are guilty of wrongdoing.1 9 This solution, of course, would transform offenses
of risk-prevention into cases of subjective criminality. When the conduct is not

113. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-11(a)(3) (1995).
114. 21 U.S.C. § 863(d) (2000).
115. See Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. U.S., 511 U.S. 513 (1994). This case also involves an excellent
example of how overlapping offenses result in charge-stacking: In addition to selling drug
paraphernalia, the defendant was convicted of conspiring to sell drug paraphernalia, aiding and
abetting the manufacturing and distribution of controlled substances, investing income derived from a
drug offense, money laundering, and engaging in monetary transactions with the proceeds of unlawful
activity. Id. at 515.
116. See e.g. N.Y. Penal Law § 220.50 (McKinney 1999).
117. I explore many of these issues further in Douglas N. Husak, Reasonable Risk Creation and
Overinclusive Legislation, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 599 (1998).
118. See Duff, supra n. 2, at 5.
119. Impossible attempts are probably an exception. A defendant who intends to commit a crime
and performs acts beyond mere preparation does not create a risk of harm when he cannot possibly
succeed in completing that crime. See id. at 76-115. As Fletcher notes, commentators disagree about
whether liability should be imposed in cases of impossible attempts.
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sufficiently risky on its face, wrongfulness must be located in the defendant's state
of mind. Although neither of the alternatives I have described is wholly
unproblematic, they succeed in allowing the state to use the criminal law to
prevent risk while minimizing the likelihood that unjustified punishments will be
imposed.
But the third category of crime I have identified-ancillary offenses-is
perhaps the most vulnerable of all. Many of these offenses conform to no pattern
that could reasonably provide the basis for deserved punishment. Return to two
of the examples Abrams mentioned-the Federal Money Laundering and Bank
Secrecy Acts. Can these ancillary offenses possibly be categorized within the
pattern of manifest criminality, subjective criminality, or harmful consequences?
Do they await the defense of new patterns of liability? Presumably, they do not
represent modes of wrongdoing at all, and are enacted simply to ease the burdens
on prosecutors. Ronald Gainer expresses his dissatisfaction with these offenses as
follows:
Sometimes the operating philosophy seems to be that, if government cannot
prosecute what it wishes to penalize, it will penalize what it can prosecute....
[M]oving beyond penalization of collateral misconduct to the penalization of
collateral, seemingly innocent conduct, that causes no real independent harm but
that may be associated with either lawful or unlawful actions,
raises jurisprudential
12
questions that lawmakers have not frequently chosen to face. 0
Despite the cogency of his analysis, I do not think that Gainer accurately
identifies the precise nature of the "jurisprudential questions" raised by the
ancillary crimes to which he refers. He seems to be worried that punishing
relatively innocuous conduct contributes to the trivialization of criminalization
and thereby erodes respect for law, undermining its general efficacy as a
deterrent. 1' A number of commentators have voiced similar concerns,12 2 although
good empirical evidence for this conjecture is not easy to find. In any event, I do
not believe that empirical speculation is needed in order to understand what is
objectionable about these ancillary offenses. My own conclusion is not simply that
these crimes erode respect for law, but that they should not be crimes at all. At
the very least, the case for justifiably punishing persons who commit these crimes
has not been demonstrated.
Perhaps my position may be expressed in different terms. The ancillary
crimes in question (and some offenses of risk-prevention as well) are sometimes
described as malum prohibitum rather than as malum in se offenses. This ancient
contrast might be invoked in the present context, despite the notorious difficulties
in drawing it. Roughly, an offense is an instance of malum prohibitum when it
proscribes conduct that is not a case of wrongdoing prior to or independent of the

120. Ronald L. Gainer, Federal CriminalCode Reform: Past and Future, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 45, 63
n. 19 (1998).
121. Id. at 78.
122. See e.g. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame (Westview Press
1995).
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law that defined it as criminal. 123 It is hard to see how malum prohibitum offenses
conform to any of Fletcher's patterns and could be assigned to the core of the
criminal law. How, then, can we justify punishing persons who commit these
crimes? Could malum prohibitum possibly represent a new pattern of liability?
Admittedly, it is radical to suggest that these offenses cannot be justified, and
deserved punishment may only be imposed for mala in se.124 Rethinking is a
ground-breaking book, but I am uncomfortable in attributing this radical position
to Fletcher. Regrettably, the terms malum in se, malum prohibitum (or even
regulatory offense) do not so much as appear in the index to Rethinking. My
conclusion, then, is best expressed more cautiously, as a challenge: If no defense of
punishment for these malum prohibitum offenses can be provided-if we cannot
give a plausible and coherent account of what punishment is applied for-it is
hard to see how these offenses are legitimate uses of the criminal sanction. I invite
those philosophers of criminal law who share Fletcher's nonpositivist orientation
to try to meet this challenge. 125
CONCLUSION

I tentatively conclude that crimes outside the core are best understood to be
those offenses that have not been justified as legitimate exercises of state power
over free and autonomous individuals. A peripheral offense does not conform to
a pattern of liability that provides a coherent and plausible basis for punishing
those who commit it. In the absence of a basis for believing otherwise, it is
reasonable to infer that we cannot justify the punishment of persons who commit
these crimes. Again, I do not insist that only the three patterns of liability
described by Fletcher should be included in our theory of criminalization. But if I
am correct to suppose that each of the patterns that should ultimately be
countenanced represents a different mode of wrongdoing-something
punishment may be imposed for-it seems clear that these patterns, when
construed normatively, rule out some possible conduct as meriting justified
punishment. All overlapping offenses, some offenses of risk-prevention, but no
ancillary offenses belong in the core. 126 The burden suggested by Rethinking-or,
more precisely, by my interpretation of it-is that the justification for punishing
persons who commit crimes outside the core has yet to be found.

123. I hope that this rough characterization captures how most theorists understand the nature of
malum prohibitum. Still, I am aware of several problems with this definition. One problem is that
even mala in se offenses may include a malum prohibitum component. The application of homicide
offenses, for example, must specify when a victim is dead. The definition of death may be partly
stipulative.
124. For further thoughts, see Douglas N. Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in Defining
Crimes: Essays on the Criminal Law's Special Part (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., Oxford U. Press
forthcoming 2005).
125. A few criminal theorists have tried to meet this challenge. See e.g. R.A. Duff, Crime,
Prohibition,and Punishment, 19 J. Applied Phil. 97, 102 (2002); Green, supra n. 11.
126. More precisely, overlapping offenses belong in the core if the generic offense with which they
overlap belongs in the core.
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